

**Atheism Under the Microscope**  
*Osama Qatrani | Vol 1 – 2025*

## **Faith, Not Trance: A Rational Refutation of Zindler's Thesis on Religion and Hypnosis**

*Beyond Neural Illusions: A Critical Reply to Zindler's Evolutionary  
Thesis on Religion and Hypnosis*

---


**By Osama S. Qatrani** Reply to Frank Zindler's (All rights reserved)

**Atheism Under the Microscope**  
**Osama Qatrani | Vol 1 – 2025**

# **Beyond Neural Illusions**

**A Critical Reply to Zindler's  
Evolutionary Thesis on Religion  
and Hypnosis**


**By Osama S. Qatrani**  
**Reply to Frank Zindler's**




### Abstract

This paper offers a critical response to Frank Zindler’s 1984 essay “Religion, Hypnosis, and Music: An Evolutionary Perspective.” Zindler proposes that religious experience is a neurobiological byproduct of hypnotic suggestibility and musical stimulation—an adaptive illusion rather than a valid epistemic framework. While acknowledging Zindler’s historical context and intellectual sincerity, this paper challenges the reductionist nature of his claims. It argues that religion cannot be adequately explained through neurochemical responses or group selection theory alone. Drawing on interdisciplinary evidence from neurotheology, anthropology, and philosophy of mind, the paper presents religion as a structured moral and metaphysical system, not a cognitive glitch. It highlights the philosophical inconsistencies in equating evolutionary utility with truth, and critiques the ideological bias in scientific reductionism. The paper also emphasizes the civilizational role of religion in shaping ethics, science, art, and human dignity across cultures. Ultimately, it calls for a deeper, fairer dialogue between religious traditions and secular critiques—one that respects the complexity of spiritual experience and the quest for meaning. Religion is not merely survival-driven illusion; it is a human expression of transcendence, justice, and moral awakening. Zindler’s thesis raises valuable questions—but fails to capture the full cognitive, ethical, and historical dimensions of religious consciousness.


**Note :** This paper does not seek to portray Zindler as an adversary, nor to treat his views with condescension. Rather, it aims to bring balance into the conversation—a balance that acknowledges the force of his critique, yet refuses to reduce religion to merely neural residue or evolutionary accident. We respond as equals in pursuit of clarity, not as antagonists in search of victory.



**Figure 1. Comparative Visual Map: Zindler vs. Rational-Philosophical Framework**



**This diagram compares two contrasting explanatory models of religion. On the left, Zindler’s model presents religion as an evolutionary byproduct driven by neural suggestibility and group selection. On the right, the rational-philosophical framework interprets religion as a structured inquiry grounded in symbolic and ethical cognition, leading to a metaphysical worldview.**



## Preliminary Note: Inherited Faith and the Search for Meaning

Before engaging with Zindler’s core claims, it is essential to clarify the **existential and philosophical context** of this response. Under a strictly materialist or atheistic worldview, the human being lives once—there is no afterlife, no metaphysical return, and no transcendent continuity. Within such a framework, one’s only legacy lies in **memory, history, and cultural transmission**.

In this light, **reclaiming ancestral belief** is not a romantic indulgence. It is a **moral and intellectual necessity**.

I did not choose:

- **My native language,**
- **My race or body,**
- **My tribe or nationality,**
- **Whether I was born into wealth or poverty,**
- **Whether my family was empowered or oppressed.**

But there is one domain where conscious recovery is possible: The inherited belief system transmitted through **emotion, loyalty, and unexamined tradition**.

This raises a vital question:

**Have I simply inherited a worldview, or have I examined it with reason and conscience?**


This is not just personal reflection. It is a **philosophical imperative**.

The Qur’an recounts that when the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ invited his people to monotheism, they replied: “*Shall we abandon what we found our forefathers worshipping?*” (Qur’an 31:21) Islam’s answer was not **emotional rejection**, but **reasoned moral clarity**. It challenged blind tradition with ethical and intellectual argumentation.

That same dialectic—between **inherited belief** and **reasoned conviction**—lies at the heart of all serious inquiry into religion, across cultures and centuries.

This paper, therefore, is **not** an attack on atheism, nor a blind defense of tradition. It is a **call to examine**, with honesty, the metaphysical questions we all inherit.

Even if truth remains elusive or ultimately unreachable, the sincere pursuit of it remains: An act of human dignity.



### Areas of Agreement, Disagreement, and Empathetic Understanding


Zindler's paper, written in 1984, emerged from a time of Cold War polarization and the rise of atheistic materialism in Western thought. Any critique today must be aware of that context. His tone reflects urgency, not malice—and provocation, not personal disdain.

Compared to several modern atheist commentators, [Zindler](#) appears more respectful and grounded. Some, like [Mrejeru](#), rely on personal authority ("40 years of reading"), while others, like [Grant](#), engage in misrepresentation and emotional rhetoric rather than argument. Others hide behind peer-review walls, refusing open dialogue. [Zindler](#), by contrast, invites engagement.

While his linking of religion to hypnosis and music is reductive, it is also sincere and internally coherent. One may challenge it, but must acknowledge its structure. He does not mock belief—he critiques it.

For that reason, Zindler—though not necessarily correct—is more respectable than many modern polemicists. A fair critique should honor that distinction. It allows us to engage in meaningful disagreement without losing intellectual dignity.





### Introduction

Frank Zindler's 1984 paper, *Religion, Hypnosis, and Music: An Evolutionary Perspective*, was written in a vastly different cultural and ideological climate than today. The four decades separating 1984 from 2025 witnessed significant shifts in academic freedom, religious tolerance, and the public discourse on belief systems.

Judging Zindler's work by today's standards risks overlooking the intellectual risks he faced. In the 1980s, Western societies still held strong Christian undercurrents. Public atheism could result in social backlash. Linking religion to hypnosis and manipulation wasn't just a scientific hypothesis—it was a bold intellectual stand.

This context matters. Publishing such ideas in that era often meant intellectual isolation or social condemnation. Mutual respect between worldviews had only just begun to develop.

Thus, this response does not dismiss Zindler's motives. Rather, it engages his ideas respectfully—recognizing the courage they required while holding them to critical standards. Boldness does not shield arguments from scrutiny.

Zindler's essay aligns with a broader wave of atheist literature emerging in the late 20th century, alongside thinkers such as Richard Dawkins<sup>1</sup>, Daniel Dennett<sup>2</sup>, Carl Sagan<sup>3</sup>, and Michel Onfray<sup>4</sup>. These figures framed religion as a cognitive illusion shaped by evolution—a legacy of neural misfires and sociocultural utility.

This school of thought thrived in an era when Marx's aphorism "religion is the opium of the people" was being recast in neuroscientific and evolutionary terms. Religion, in this model, was not debated for its truth—it was dissected as a psychological byproduct.

Zindler's title itself—pairing religion with hypnosis and music—reflects this worldview. But recognizing his ideological context does not excuse the reductionism it produced. This paper aims to respond not with hostility, but with interdisciplinary rigor and intellectual fairness.

Frank Zindler, a prominent atheist thinker and former editor of American Atheist Press, is known for advocating the Christ Myth Theory, which denies the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth. He has participated in the Jesus Seminar and has written extensively on secular critiques of religious narratives.<sup>5</sup>

---


<sup>1</sup> Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (Oxford University Press, 2006)

<sup>2</sup> Daniel C. Dennett, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon* (Viking, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> Carl Sagan, *The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark* (Random House, 1996).

<sup>4</sup> Michel Onfray, *Atheist Manifesto* (Arcade Publishing, 2005).

<sup>5</sup> Frank R. Zindler, *The Jesus the Jews Never Knew: Sepher Toldoth Yeshu and the Quest of the Historical Jesus in Jewish Sources* (American Atheist Press, 2003). Zindler presents a detailed argument denying the historical existence of Jesus, in line with the Christ Myth Theory, which is rejected by most mainstream historians and biblical scholars.



## Introductory Framework → A Call for Sincere Rational Engagement Toward a Sincere and Rational Response

Now that we have situated Frank Zindler’s paper within its historical and ideological context—and distinguished his tone from the dismissiveness often seen in modern polemics—we can proceed to engage his arguments directly, without malice and without compromise.

This response is not a polemic, nor a faith-based reaction rooted in fear or nostalgia. It is an invitation to critical reflection—grounded in logic, informed by evidence, and enriched by cross-disciplinary insight. What Zindler has the right to question, others have the right—and responsibility—to examine, refine, or defend, so long as the dialogue remains intellectually honest.

We shall identify conceptual gaps, epistemological leaps, and methodological vulnerabilities in his argument. Where Zindler reduces religion to psychological conditioning or evolutionary expediency, we will respond with insights from anthropology, theology, neuroethics, and the philosophy of mind.

More importantly, we will spotlight what his analysis omits:


- The moral grammar embedded in religious tradition,
- The aesthetic and metaphysical dimensions of worship,
- And the transformative experiences that billions describe not as delusion, but as depth.

Religion is not merely an evolutionary artifact or cognitive illusion—it is a vessel of meaning, a historical force, and for many, the highest form of existential dignity.

Our aim is not to “defeat” Zindler, but to **dignify the debate**. As the Qur’an commands:

*“Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in ways that are best”* (Qur’an 16:125).

With that spirit, we now begin.



### Section 1: Critique of the Title — “Religion, Hypnosis, and Music”

The title of Zindler’s paper, **Religion, Hypnosis, and Music: An Evolutionary Perspective**, introduces a conceptual bias. By pairing religion with hypnosis and music—terms often associated with involuntary suggestion and emotional manipulation—Zindler implies that religion is rooted in neuropsychological control. This framing subtly preconditions the reader before any evidence is discussed.

This reductionist grouping suggests that religion, like hypnosis or music, is a product of biological reflexes rather than rational inquiry or moral philosophy. But would we accept similar framings such as “Justice, Hypnosis, and Music”? The selectivity reveals a philosophical stance, not scientific neutrality. As philosopher Thomas Nagel<sup>6</sup> stated: “Reductionism about the mind is not merely a scientific claim—it is a philosophical one.”

Religion engages higher faculties—moral law, metaphysics, legal theory, and existential questioning—unlike music or trance. Charles Taylor<sup>7</sup>, in *A Secular Age*, describes religion as part of a complex moral and metaphysical framework, not reducible to brain chemistry.

Zindler applies reductionism narrowly. Why is religion treated this way, but not democracy, love, or science? As Justin Barrett<sup>8</sup> argues, this selectivity reflects cultural bias masked as scientific explanation.

Rather than examining whether religion could be true, Zindler’s framing treats it as illusion—a neurochemical trick like Marx’s “opium of the people,” but now as ‘dopamine for the masses.’ This is not falsifiable science; it is ideological critique in scientific disguise.

In Islam, belief arises through reason (‘Aql), evidence (Dalil), and innate moral sense (Fitrah). The Quran challenges blind imitation: “Do they not use their reason?” (10:100), “Do they not reflect upon the Quran?” (4:82). This contradicts the notion of belief as trance or reflex.

Zindler’s title presumes a neurological origin of religion, which misrepresents religion’s intellectual, moral, and legal dimensions. A scientific critique should assess religion alongside all human meaning-systems—not isolate it with suggestibility. The paper thus reveals a philosophical bias disguised as evolutionary analysis.


---

<sup>6</sup> Nagel, T. (1986). *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>7</sup> Taylor, C. (2007). *A Secular Age*. Harvard University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Barrett, J. L. (2004). *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?* AltaMira Press.





### Section 2: The Problem of Scientific Reductionism

Zindler's attempt to explain religion as an evolutionary byproduct relies on scientific reductionism—the belief that complex human experiences can be fully explained through neurological, behavioral, or genetic mechanisms. In framing religion as a form of hypnotic suggestibility reinforced by music and group rituals, he commits a category error by reducing existential and metaphysical phenomena to basic biological reflexes. This reduction is analogous to defining language solely as vocal vibration or morality purely as a mechanism for herd survival. Such reductionist tendencies are not only scientifically insufficient but also philosophically naive.<sup>9</sup>

Reductionism assumes that by analyzing smaller components, one can explain the whole. However, this view collapses under scrutiny when applied to abstract, normative systems like religion. Neuroscience might describe the brain activity of someone praying, but it says nothing about the validity or truth of their prayer. As Roger Scruton asserts, reducing love to hormones or music to sound waves 'misses the point.'<sup>10</sup> Religion, like love or art, involves intentionality and layered meaning beyond chemical processes. Furthermore, research in neurotheology challenges Zindler's hypothesis. Newberg and D'Aquili's studies (2001) indicate that spiritual experiences activate specific brain regions distinct from those linked to hallucinations or hypnosis. Religious cognition may be neurologically unique and evolutionarily adaptive, not merely residual. Psychological research also demonstrates that religious commitment correlates with greater well-being, moral behavior, and resilience—findings inconsistent with the notion of religion as pathological trance.<sup>11</sup>

Zindler's thesis fails to acknowledge the intellectual depth within religious traditions. Whether it be Islamic rational theology (Ilm al-Kalam), Thomistic metaphysics in Christianity, or Maimonidean logic in Judaism, religious thought has long engaged with complex philosophical questions. To reduce religion to evolutionary reflexes strips it of this legacy and ignores centuries of rigorous metaphysical debate.<sup>12</sup>

From an Islamic perspective, belief is rooted in reason (ʿaql), evidence (dalil), and innate moral nature (fitrah). The Qur'an repeatedly invites human beings to reflect and reason—indicating that faith is a cognitive, not reflexive, process: "Do they not reflect?" (Qur'an 6:50). Religion in Islam is not a social adaptation—it is a truth claim supported by cosmic signs and introspective reasoning.<sup>13</sup>

Zindler's approach exemplifies ideological atheism,<sup>14</sup> wherein skepticism is weaponized to discredit belief without genuine engagement. This attitude, seen in segments of secular modernity, replaces inquiry with caricature. A meaningful critique of religion must employ philosophical rigor, epistemic humility, and historical awareness—not dismissive speculation dressed in scientific jargon.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (1981).

<sup>10</sup> Roger Scruton, *The Soul of the World* (2014).


<sup>11</sup> Emmons, R. A. (2005). *The Psychology of Ultimate Concerns*.

<sup>12</sup> See theological traditions such as Ilm al-Kalam (Islam), Thomism (Christianity), and Maimonidean logic (Judaism).

<sup>13</sup> Qur'an 6:50, 41:53, and broader Islamic epistemology.

<sup>14</sup> "ideological atheism," we refer to a form of atheism not merely based on personal disbelief in deities, but rooted in a broader metaphysical and political rejection of religious worldviews—often treating religion as inherently oppressive, irrational, or obsolete, regardless of context.

<sup>15</sup> Alvin Plantinga, *Where the Conflict Really Lies* (2011).



## Section 3: The Misapplication of Group Selection Theory

### 3.1: The Fallacy of Survival of the Falsest

Zindler provocatively asks: “*Could Survival of the Falsest be a corollary derivable from Survival of the Fittest?*”<sup>16</sup> While rhetorically effective, this formulation commits a fundamental error: it conflates **adaptive utility** with **epistemic validity**.

In evolutionary terms, a belief can be biologically advantageous without being factually correct. A false belief that boosts group cohesion, reduces existential anxiety, or motivates sacrifice might help a population survive—but this does not make the belief *true*. Conversely, some truths (e.g., cosmic insignificance or existential void) may be maladaptive in a purely Darwinian sense, yet remain philosophically or scientifically robust.


To equate survival with truth is to commit a **naturalistic fallacy**—deriving epistemological value from biological function. As philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues in his evolutionary epistemology critique, if evolution selects for fitness rather than truth, then the reliability of our cognitive faculties becomes itself questionable. If religion is deemed false merely because it is adaptive, then by the same logic, scientific reasoning—also a product of evolution—could be dismissed as survival-driven illusion.

Moreover, moral and metaphysical truths are not validated by reproduction or group fitness. Concepts like human dignity, justice, or the sanctity of life do not survive because they maximize gene propagation, but because they resonate with conscience and reason. To reduce these values to biological impulses strips them of their normative force.

Thus, “Survival of the Falsest” is not a scientific insight—it is an ideological slogan. It reflects **philosophical reductionism masquerading as evolutionary logic**. Evolutionary usefulness may explain *why* a belief spreads, but not *whether* it is worth believing.

---

<sup>16</sup> This formulation, while rhetorically effective, conflates adaptive value with truth-value. As Plantinga and others argue, evolutionary success does not imply epistemic reliability. See: Plantinga, A. (1993). *Warrant and Proper Function*. Oxford University Press.



One of the central claims in Zindler’s argument is that religion evolved primarily as an adaptation to enhance group survival—a claim grounded in group selection theory. While initially plausible, this idea suffers from serious scientific, philosophical, and historical flaws.

---

### 1. Group Selection vs. Individual Selection

Zindler treats group selection as a dominant mechanism in evolution. However, this is not supported by scientific consensus.

- **Richard Dawkins** argues in *The Selfish Gene* that natural selection operates primarily at the level of genes or individuals, not groups. Traits that benefit a group but reduce individual fitness tend to disappear unless they confer a direct reproductive advantage<sup>17</sup>.
- **Steven Pinker** describes group selection as “a seductive but ultimately misleading idea,” noting that most traits attributed to group survival can be explained through individual-level psychology or reciprocal altruism<sup>18</sup>.
- **Even David Sloan Wilson**, a major proponent of group selection, concedes its limitations and the difficulty of testing it empirically<sup>19</sup>.
- **Jerry Coyne** critiques the reduction of religion to adaptive group-level traits, warning against justifying beliefs simply because they are useful<sup>20</sup>.

Thus, grounding the emergence of religion in group selection is scientifically weak and conceptually reductive.


---

<sup>17</sup> Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene*, Oxford University Press, 1976

<sup>18</sup> Steven Pinker, “The False Allure of Group Selection,” *Edge.org*, 2012.

<sup>19</sup> David Sloan Wilson, *Darwin's Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society*, University of Chicago Press, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Jerry A. Coyne, “Of Vice and Men,” *The New Republic*, May 2009.



### 2. Religion as Moral Disruption, Not Social Glue

If religion merely evolved to strengthen group cohesion, it becomes difficult to explain why many religious founders and reformers were rejected by their societies:

- Prophets such as Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad were often marginalized or persecuted by their own communities.
- Religious reformers throughout history have exposed injustice, challenged tribal or national interests, and called for moral transformation—at significant personal cost.

Qur'an 61:5: “*Why do you hurt me, when you know I am the messenger of Allah to you?*” (Regarding **Moses**).


Gospel of Mark 6:4: “*A prophet is not without honor except in his own town...*” (Regarding **Jesus**).

Ibn Hisham, Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyyah, Vol. 1: Detailed accounts of Quraysh rejecting **Muhammad** ﷺ, persecuting early Muslims, and mocking the prophetic message.

This suggests that religion can act as a **moral critique** of the group, not merely as a tool for cohesion. **Jonathan Haidt**, although acknowledging religion's cohesive function, emphasizes its role in moral reasoning beyond survival logic<sup>21</sup>.

---

<sup>21</sup> Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*, Pantheon, 2012.



### 3. Philosophical and Historical Limitations

Reducing religion to a tool of group adaptation neglects key dimensions:

- **Theological content:** Religious doctrines contain metaphysical and cosmological claims, not just bonding rituals<sup>22</sup>.
- **Existential purpose:** Religion addresses death, suffering, and moral meaning—not just cooperation<sup>23</sup>.
- **Diversity and tension:** The rise of monotheism, the Protestant Reformation, and Sufi mysticism were deeply disruptive to their respective groups<sup>24</sup>.

The explanatory model fails to account for the richness and conflict inherent in religious history. **Talal Asad** warns that such functionalist theories project modern Western categories onto premodern and non-Western traditions, distorting their meaning<sup>25</sup>.

### 4. The Risk of Evolutionary Reductionism

If religious belief is reduced to evolutionary utility, we risk collapsing all ideologies—liberalism, nationalism, communism—into adaptive illusions.

- This leads to **evolutionary nihilism**<sup>26</sup>: the belief that no idea is true, only adaptive<sup>27</sup>.
- It undermines **science**, **ethics**, and even **belief in reason**, reducing them to survival tools rather than legitimate truth-seeking efforts.

**Alasdair MacIntyre** argues that once moral and religious systems are stripped of transcendent reference, they lose coherence and devolve into emotive preferences<sup>28</sup>.

---

<sup>22</sup> Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

<sup>23</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.

<sup>24</sup> Reza Aslan, *No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam*, Random House, 2005.


<sup>25</sup> Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

<sup>26</sup> Evolutionary nihilism “describes the philosophical consequence of viewing all aspects of human experience—such as morality, beauty, or purpose—as mere evolutionary adaptations without intrinsic value or truth, thus reducing meaning to survival utility alone.

<sup>27</sup> Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, Fortress Press, 1962.

<sup>28</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981.





### Acknowledging Valid Observations in Zindler's Framework

While Frank Zindler's evolutionary framework attempts to reduce religion to a by-product of neurological evolution—stripping it of epistemic and metaphysical validity—it nonetheless touches upon a crucial and often-neglected aspect of religious experience: the role of communal rituals in fostering group cohesion.

Indeed, scientific studies, including the work of **Andrew Newberg**<sup>29</sup> (2009), have demonstrated that rhythmic chanting, collective singing, and synchronized movements can produce measurable synchronization in brain wave patterns among participants. These neurobiological effects are known to enhance feelings of unity, emotional bonding, and social identity within religious or spiritual gatherings.


However, acknowledging this behavioral function does not invalidate the deeper dimensions of religion—**metaphysical, ethical, or existential**. Rather, it complements them. Religious traditions do not use ritual merely to manipulate emotion or enforce conformity; they employ it to **express higher truths, embody moral visions, and guide human purpose**.

To recognize the psychological effects of rituals is not to reduce faith to them. It is possible to understand the mechanics of religious expression without dismissing the meaning it carries.

*Zindler's intuition—that religion engages deep neuro-social mechanisms—is not false; it is incomplete. While his framework highlights the behavioral and evolutionary dimensions of religion, it overlooks its inner architecture—its cognitive depth, metaphysical aspirations, and ethical direction. In the next section, we shift our focus to these neglected dimensions, beginning with the neuroscience of religious experience.*

---

<sup>29</sup> Newberg, A. (2009). \*How God Changes Your Brain: Breakthrough Findings from a Leading Neuroscientist. Ballantine Books.



## Section 4: Religious Experience and Cognitive Complexity

### 4.1 Neurotheology and Structured Consciousness

Recent developments in neurotheology have significantly expanded our understanding of the neural correlates of religious and spiritual experience. While early studies (e.g., Newberg & D'Aquili, 2001)<sup>30</sup> laid the groundwork for associating meditation and prayer with activity in the prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes, newer evidence provides broader empirical validation. A 2023 study by Kieckhafer et al., analyzing fMRI data from nearly 40,000<sup>31</sup> participants in the UK Biobank, demonstrated that regular participation in religious practices enhances connectivity in key brain networks associated with meaning-making, emotional regulation, and self-awareness—specifically the Default Mode Network (DMN), Salience Network (SN), and Frontoparietal Network (FPN).

In parallel, Yaden and Newberg's<sup>32</sup> updated 2022 synthesis emphasizes that religious experience involves not only neural activation but also structured consciousness and ethical insight, aligning with what William James described as the 'noetic' quality of mysticism. Likewise, McNamara's<sup>33</sup> (2022) comprehensive treatment of the cognitive neuroscience of religion supports a more nuanced view of faith—not as hallucination, but as neurologically patterned existential depth. These findings challenge reductive models like Zindler's, which overlook the complexity and diversity of religious cognition in favor of evolutionary generalization.

Zindler argues that religious experiences—visions, rituals, mystical states—are merely products of hypnotic suggestion or neurochemical illusions. However, this view is both empirically weak and cognitively reductive.

Emerging research in neurotheology reveals that spiritual states activate specific regions of the brain, including the **prefrontal cortex** (responsible for moral judgment), **parietal lobes** (spatial and self-awareness), and **temporal lobes** (linked to memory and transcendence). According to studies by Newberg<sup>34</sup> and D'Aquili (2001), practices like meditation and prayer produce stable neurophysiological patterns associated with emotional regulation, clarity, and purpose.

Importantly, many profound spiritual experiences occur in solitude and are triggered not by rituals or music, but by existential reflection, suffering, or contemplation—showing that they are cognitively structured, not spontaneous glitches.

Religious cognition involves complex functions such as symbolic reasoning, ethical abstraction, and meaning-making. These demand active participation and higher-order awareness, not passive trance-like states. Unlike hypnosis, which narrows focus, authentic spiritual experience often expands awareness and deepens moral insight.

---


<sup>30</sup> Whitehouse, H. (2021). *The Ritual Animal: Imitation and Cohesion in the Evolution of Social Complexity*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>31</sup> Kieckhafer, J. M., Shenhav, A., Grotzinger, A. D., & Yaden, D. B. (2023). Functional brain networks underlying religious practice: Evidence from 40,000 UK Biobank participants. *\*NeuroImage\**, 276, 120212.

<sup>32</sup> Yaden, D. B., & Newberg, A. B. (2022). *\*The Varieties of Spiritual Experience: 21st Century Research and Perspectives\**. Oxford University Press.

<sup>33</sup> McNamara, P. (2022). *\*The Cognitive Neuroscience of Religious Experience\** (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.


<sup>34</sup> Newberg, A., & D'Aquili, E. (2001). *Why God Won't Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief*. Ballantine Books.



## 4.2 Philosophy of Religious Experience


To visualize the conceptual divergence between Zindler’s reductionist framework and the integrative model presented here, the following chart offers a comparative depth analysis across three key domains:

**Figure 2: Comparative Depth of Zindler’s Hypothesis vs. Counter Perspective**



Zindler commits a category error when he equates brain activity with illusion. That religious experience has a neurological basis does not invalidate its content. The same logic would disqualify love, logic, or mathematics simply because they involve neural patterns. As **William James** emphasized, mystical states often carry a *noetic* quality—conveying insight and transformation, not just emotion<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>35</sup> James, W. (1902). *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. Longmans, Green & Co.



From a cross-cultural perspective, mystical experiences exhibit remarkable consistency across traditions:


- **Advaita Vedanta** in Hinduism
- **Sufi tafakkur** and *dhikr* in Islam
- **Christian contemplative mysticism**
- **Zen kenshō** in Buddhism
- **Vision quests** in indigenous traditions

Common themes include the dissolution of ego, unity of being, and overwhelming moral awe. These parallels suggest a **deep universal structure in consciousness**,<sup>36</sup> not mere cultural programming or delusion.

In the Islamic tradition, spiritual depth arises through *muraqabah* (mindful awareness), *zikr* (active remembrance), and *tahqiq* (critical reflection). Faith is not emotional surrender but a form of disciplined, conscious awakening rooted in the intellect (*'aql*) and innate moral nature (*fitrah*). Zindler's theory fails to account for this ethical and cognitive architecture. Religious experience is not neurological debris. It is a profound encounter with metaphysical meaning—structured by symbol, enriched by ethics, and sustained by inner struggle and reflection.

---

<sup>36</sup> Hood, R. W. (2001). *Dimensions of Mystical Experience: Empirical Studies and Psychological Links*. Rodopi



### 4.3 Ritual as Moral Encoding: Beyond Suggestibility

While Zindler frames religious rituals as techniques of hypnotic manipulation, modern anthropology presents a far more nuanced view. Rituals, far from being mere triggers of trance, function as powerful encoders of **collective memory, moral identity, and social cohesion**.

Harvey Whitehouse’s cognitive theory of ritual modes distinguishes between **repetitive (doctrinal)** rituals and **intense (imagistic)** ones, showing that each contributes differently to **long-term moral formation** and group identity<sup>37</sup>. His findings undermine the idea that rituals merely induce submission or conformity.

Likewise, Victor Turner emphasizes that ritual can create *communitas*—a liminal space in which participants experience **moral equality, emotional bonding, and ethical renewal**, often challenging rather than reinforcing social hierarchies<sup>38</sup>. These anthropological insights complicate Zindler’s narrative and affirm that ritual serves not only evolutionary survival, but **moral significance and civilizational renewal**.

The following diagram illustrates the conceptual shift between Zindler’s reductionist framing and the multidimensional response presented in this paper. It summarizes key contrasts across three domains—neuroscience, evolution, and religious cognition:


**Figure 3: Contrasting Zindler’s Reductionist Model with a Philosophical-Integrative Response**

Dimension	Zindler’s Model	Countermodel
<b>Neural Basis</b>	Passive neural conditioning; reflexive suggestibility	Structured cognitive and moral experience
<b>Religion</b>	Evolutionary neural opiate; tool for tribal cohesion	A moral, aesthetic, and epistemic framework beyond survival
<b>Evolutionary Function</b>	Illusory group cohesion mechanism	Civilizational driver for justice, knowledge, and ethical progress
<b>Music</b>	Induction of trance and dissolution of individual consciousness	Aesthetic language for collective emotional expression
<b>Ritual</b>	Trance technique for collective submission	Encoding of ethical identity and existential meaning
<b>Religious Experience</b>	Endorphin-induced hallucinations	Multidimensional awareness (symbolic, ethical, epistemic)

<sup>37</sup> Whitehouse, H. (2004). *Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission*. AltaMira Press.

<sup>38</sup> Turner, V. (1969). *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*. Aldine Transaction.







## Atheism Under the Microscope

Osama Qatrani | Vol 1 – 2025

Figure 4: Conceptual Divergence Between Zindler's View and a Rational-Philosophical Countermodel





## Section 5: Religion as Civilizational Catalyst

Zindler portrays religion as an outdated survival mechanism: once useful for tribal cohesion, now obsolete. But history tells a more complex story. Religion wasn't just tolerated in civilizations—it helped build them.

### 5.1 Religion and the Rise of Science

In the Islamic Golden Age, scholars like Al-Khwarizmi<sup>39</sup> and Ibn al-Haytham<sup>40</sup> pioneered algebra, optics, and empirical methods driven by religious inspiration. Their pursuit of knowledge was rooted in Qur'anic imperatives to observe and reflect.

In the Christian tradition, thinkers like Thomas Aquina<sup>41</sup> merged Aristotelian logic with theology, while Isaac Newton viewed scientific discovery as a path to understanding divine order. Jewish scholars such as Maimonides created detailed syntheses of Torah, philosophy,<sup>42</sup> and science.

These examples challenge the notion of conflict between religion and science. Faith often laid the groundwork for reason.

### 5.2 Religious Ethics and Moral Philosophy

Zindler dismisses religious ethics as manipulative yet offers no viable secular moral replacement. Human dignity, rights, and justice were religious before they were philosophical.

In Islam and Christianity, the human being is seen as created in God's image or as God's steward—ideas foundational to later humanist thought. Even Enlightenment ideals trace their ethical roots to Judeo-Christian concepts of moral worth and liberty.


---

<sup>39</sup> Al-Khwarizmi is credited with systematizing algebra; see: Jim Al-Khalili, *Pathfinders: The Golden Age of Arabic Science* (Penguin, 2010).

<sup>40</sup> Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) is considered the father of optics; see A. I. Sabra, "The Optics of Ibn al-Haytham," Oxford University Press.

<sup>41</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

<sup>42</sup> Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed* (Dover Publications, reprint edition).



### 5.3 Religion as Moral Resistance

Far from pacifying masses, religion often inspired resistance. Martin Luther King Jr., Gandhi, and others drew moral strength from their faith traditions. In Islamic memory, Imam Hussain<sup>43</sup> stands as a symbol of sacrifice and defiance against injustice.

These movements weren't mass delusions. They were ethical awakenings catalyzed by spiritual frameworks.

### 5.4 Religion and Cultural Flourishing


Religion inspired art, architecture, and philosophy across civilizations. Sacred buildings weren't just spaces of worship—they were achievements in mathematics and aesthetics. Religious texts standardized languages and shaped thought systems.

Even secular humanism borrows its language of rights, dignity, and justice from millennia of religious discourse.

---

---

<sup>43</sup> See Abdulaziz Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of the Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism* (SUNY Press, 1981).



## Section 6: Final Rational Response to Zindler's Thesis

### 6.1 From Hypothesis to Oversimplification

Frank Zindler proposes a bold hypothesis: that religion, like hypnosis and music, stems from evolved mechanisms of emotional suggestibility. While intellectually provocative, his thesis ultimately collapses under the weight of **scientific reductionism**, **philosophical inconsistency**, and **historical generalization**.

What begins as a speculative neuroscientific analogy becomes an unwarranted disqualification of the entire religious enterprise—a move that is neither logically necessary nor empirically defensible<sup>44</sup>.

### 6.2 False Equivalency: Suggestion ≠ Spirituality

- Hypnosis involves temporary altered states via external suggestion.
- Music activates memory and emotion through rhythm and repetition.
- Religion, however, engages with **metaphysics**, **moral law**, **community identity**, and **transcendence**.

To reduce belief in God to neurochemical patterns is akin to reducing justice to hormonal fluctuations. The **physical basis** of an experience does not negate its **truth-value**<sup>45</sup>.

### 6.3 Evolutionary Speculation ≠ Historical Causation

Zindler assumes religion emerged as a group survival strategy—a theory common in speculative evolutionary psychology, yet it:

- Infers backward from current behavior without robust archaeological or genetic evidence<sup>46</sup>.
- Assumes adaptive origin implies metaphysical falsehood, which is a **non sequitur**<sup>47</sup>.

Truth is not disqualified by utility. And antiquity is not equivalent to obsolescence.


---

<sup>44</sup> Zindler, F. R. (1984). *Religion, Hypnosis, and Music: An Evolutionary Perspective*. American Atheist, October.

<sup>45</sup> James, W. (1902). *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Longmans, Green & Co.

<sup>46</sup> Coyne, J. (2012). *Faith vs. Fact: Why Science and Religion Are Incompatible*. Viking.

<sup>47</sup> Plantinga, A. (1993). *Warrant and Proper Function*. Oxford University Press.



### 6.4 Inconsistency in Reductionist Logic

If Zindler's reductionism were applied consistently:

- **Science** becomes mere neural pattern recognition.
- **Love** becomes oxytocin release.
- **Justice** becomes reproductive strategy.

Yet he exempts science itself from this reductive logic—revealing a philosophical inconsistency<sup>48</sup>. A framework that reduces everything but itself is not science; it is ideology.

### 6.5 Neglect of Rational Religious Traditions

Zindler overlooks the vast philosophical and dialectical heritage of major religious traditions:

- **Islamic kalām:** Al-Farabi, Al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd
- **Christian scholasticism:** Aquinas, Anselm
- **Jewish philosophy:** Maimonides, Saadia Gaon

These schools emphasized rational proof, ethical reasoning, and metaphysical coherence—not trance or suggestion<sup>49</sup>.

### 6.6 The Human Spirit Is More Than Biology

Religion, at its core, asks existential questions:

- Why are we here?
- What is justice?
- What is suffering for?
- Is there truth beyond death?

Science can describe the “**how**”, but religion addresses the “**why**”<sup>50</sup>. To call the “why” a delusion is not rationalism—it is philosophical evasion.


---

<sup>48</sup> Scruton, R. (1997). *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>49</sup> MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. University of Notre Dame Press.

<sup>50</sup> Taylor, C. (2007). *A Secular Age*. Harvard University Press.





### 6.7 A Call for Intellectual Fairness

Rather than engaging the strongest arguments for religion, Zindler critiques simplified versions. A genuinely rational critique would:

- Recognize both the **flaws** and **depths** of religious traditions.
- Acknowledge psychological mechanisms without dismissing the **symbolic and metaphysical meaning** they carry<sup>51</sup>.
- Appreciate the **multi-layered** nature of human consciousness beyond dualistic categories.

### 6.8 Conclusion: Between Brain and Being

Zindler sees religion as **reflex**. We assert religion is **reflection**—an intellectual, emotional, and moral response to:

- The longing for transcendence
- The hunger for justice
- The rational search for meaning
- The spiritual responsibility to the self, others, and the unseen<sup>52</sup>

Explaining *how* the brain experiences faith does not negate *why* humans seek it.

A serious engagement with religion must combine:

- **Neuroscience and narrative**
- **Biology and beauty**
- **Logic and love**


Zindler's paper raises real questions, but answers them through a lens too narrow for the full complexity of the human experience<sup>53</sup>.

---

<sup>51</sup> Barrett, J. L. (2004). *Why Would Anyone Believe in God?* AltaMira Press

<sup>52</sup> Newberg, A., & D'Aquili, E. (2001). *Why God Won't Go Away: Brain Science and the Biology of Belief*. Ballantine Books

<sup>53</sup> Yaden, D. & Newberg, A. (2022). *The Varieties of Spiritual Experience: 21st Century Research and Perspectives*. Oxford University Press



## References

1. Barrett, J. L. (2004). *Why would anyone believe in God?* AltaMira Press.
2. Dawkins, R. (1976). *The selfish gene*. Oxford University Press.
3. Dennett, D. C. (2006). *Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon*. Viking.
4. James, W. (1902). *The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature*. Longmans, Green & Co.
5. MacIntyre, A. (1981). *After virtue: A study in moral theory*. University of Notre Dame Press.
6. Newberg, A., & D'Aquili, E. (2001). *Why God won't go away: Brain science and the biology of belief*. Ballantine Books.
7. Onfray, M. (2005). *Atheist manifesto: The case against Christianity, Judaism, and Islam*. Arcade Publishing.
8. Pinker, S. (2007). *The stuff of thought: Language as a window into human nature*. Viking.
9. Scruton, R. (1997). *The aesthetics of music*. Oxford University Press.
10. Sagan, C. (1996). *The demon-haunted world: Science as a candle in the dark*. Random House.
11. Taylor, C. (2007). *A secular age*. Harvard University Press.
12. Zindler, F. R. (1984). *Religion, hypnosis, and music: An evolutionary perspective*. *American Atheist*, October 1984 issue.
13. Kieckhaefer, J. M., Shenhav, A., Grotzinger, A. D., & Yaden, D. B. (2023). *Functional brain networks underlying religious practice: Evidence from 40,000 UK Biobank participants*. *NeuroImage*, 276, 120212.
14. Yaden, D. B., & Newberg, A. B. (2022). *\*The Varieties of Spiritual Experience: 21st Century Research and Perspectives\**. Oxford University Press
15. . McNamara, P. (2022). *\*The Cognitive Neuroscience of Religious Experience\** (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.