# **Towards Eudaimonia 3.0: Integrating Fiduciary, Constitutional, and Infrastructural Governance Principles into the Vision of a Plural Social Network**

## **Introduction: From Plurality to Legitimacy**

The intellectual journey of the Eudaimonia project has been marked by a progressive sophistication of its sociotechnical framework. The starting point, which can be designated as Eudaimonia 1.0, was the philosophy of **Antifragility** by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, focused on building a resilient system, capable not only of withstanding shocks but of strengthening from them.1 This foundation gave rise to a decentralized architecture and a robust ownership economy. The subsequent analysis document, "From Antifragile to Plural," proposed an evolution to Eudaimonia 2.0, transcending mere systemic resilience to embrace the philosophy of

**Plurality**.2 In this vision, social diversity is not a stressor to be overcome, but the primary engine of generativity, innovation, and democratic progress. The platform was reimagined as an ecosystem to facilitate productive friction between diverse and intersecting communities, a true engine for collective intelligence.2

However, while the vision of Eudaimonia 2.0 is powerful in its ability to generate collaborative value, it lacks an explicit framework to address the fundamental question of the **legitimacy of power**. Any social platform, especially one with the ambition to restructure human interactions, exercises a form of governmental power. It establishes rules, resolves disputes, allocates resources, and shapes discourse. The Plurality vision focuses on the collaborative *capacity* of this governance, but does not sufficiently specify its *responsibilities* and limits.

This report argues that the next logical evolution, **Eudaimonia 3.0**, must integrate a set of governance principles that ensure the platform's inherent power is exercised in a fair, responsible, predictable, and legitimate manner. This is the crucial transition from the pursuit of effective collaboration to the construction of governmental responsibility. To illuminate this path, this report conducts an in-depth analysis of five seminal academic works that, together, provide the theoretical lenses for this evolution:

1. **The Fiduciary Lens (Balkin):** Proposes that digital platforms, due to their position of power and user vulnerability, should act as **information fiduciaries**, with duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality towards their users.3  
2. **The Constitutional Lens (Suzor):** Argues that platforms exercise a private governance power that is "lawless" and should be limited by the principles of the rule of law through **digital constitutionalism**.5  
3. **The Algorithmic Governance Lens (Katzenbach & Ulbricht):** Analyzes how algorithms are not neutral tools, but rather systems of **algorithmic governance** that actively produce and enforce a social order.7  
4. **The Infrastructural Lens (Plantin et al.):** Examines the process of **"infrastructuralization,"** whereby platforms become essential and ubiquitous services, analogous to public infrastructures.9  
5. **The Pragmatic Lens (Zignani, Gaito et al.):** Offers an empirical analysis of the models and practical challenges of existing **decentralized social networks**, such as those in the Fediverse, providing a realistic counterpoint to theoretical visions.11

The central thesis of this report is that integrating these five lenses not only strengthens the vision of Eudaimonia 2.0 but fundamentally transforms it. Eudaimonia can evolve from a pluralistic ecosystem into a **legitimate digital polis**: a social infrastructure that is simultaneously pluralistic in its ethos and constitutionalist in its governance. This document will first dissect each of these theoretical lenses, then systematically apply them to a reassessment of the Eudaimonia 2.0 project, and finally synthesize a new vision and roadmap for Eudaimonia 3.0.

## **Part I: Expanding the Conceptual Arsenal: Five Lenses for Digital Governance**

This section is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of each of the five selected works, extracting their central arguments, methodology, and conclusions. The goal is to build a robust conceptual arsenal that will later be applied to the Eudaimonia project.

### **Section 1: The Platform as Fiduciary (Balkin)**

In his seminal work, "Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment," Jack M. Balkin proposes a fundamental reconfiguration of the legal relationship between digital platforms and their users.3 He argues that the standard contractual model, based on terms of service that no one reads, and the market model, which treats data as a simple commodity, are profoundly inadequate to capture the nature of the relationship established in the digital world.3

#### **Analysis of Fiduciary Duties**

Balkin maintains that certain online entities, due to the nature of their relationship with users, should be considered **information fiduciaries**. This designation is not merely descriptive; it imposes a set of legally recognized duties aimed at protecting the more vulnerable party in the relationship.4 The central duties are:

* **Duty of Care:** This duty requires the platform to manage user data with a reasonable level of technical competence and security, protecting it against breaches, loss, and corruption. It implies an obligation not to be negligent in managing the data infrastructure.13  
* **Duty of Loyalty:** This is the strictest duty. It prohibits the fiduciary from acting in ways that harm the user's interests (the "principal") to benefit itself or third parties. In the digital context, this means the platform cannot use user data to manipulate them, exploit their psychological vulnerabilities, or deceive them in ways that serve the platform's commercial interests to the detriment of the user's well-being.13  
* **Duty of Confidentiality:** This duty restricts the sharing of user information with third parties. Although not absolute (there may be exceptions for law enforcement, for example), it creates a presumption against the indiscriminate sharing of data, especially for purposes not explicitly anticipated and consented to by the user.13

#### **Justification for the Fiduciary Relationship**

The imposition of such duties is justified by the inherently asymmetric power structure of the digital relationship. Balkin, and others who have expanded on his theory, point to the **vulnerability and dependence** of users.4 Platforms hold vastly superior technical knowledge and data collection and analysis capabilities compared to their users. Users, in turn, implicitly trust these platforms to mediate their social, professional, and personal lives. This combination of asymmetric power and vested trust creates a relationship that is not one of equals, but rather a custodial relationship, analogous to that of a doctor with a patient or a lawyer with a client.4 In these cases, the law recognizes that the weaker party needs special protection against exploitation, and this protection takes the form of fiduciary duties.

The fiduciary concept offers a legal and ethical basis for the relationship between Eudaimonia and its users that transcends the mere ownership economy proposed in the 2.0 vision. The focus of Eudaimonia 2.0 on giving users ownership of their data through NFTs and social tokens is an important step.2 However, Balkin's analysis demonstrates that ownership alone is insufficient. The relationship of power and trust between the platform and the user creates a fiduciary duty that exists

*in addition to* property rights. An investment fund manager, for example, is a fiduciary and has a duty to act in the best interest of their clients, even though they do not own the assets they manage. Consequently, Eudaimonia cannot simply adopt a stance of "the data is yours, the responsibility is yours." As an entity holding asymmetric power and knowledge, the platform has an inherent and proactive duty to act in the best interest of its users, an obligation that must be reflected in the design of its algorithms, its architecture, and its governance systems.

### **Section 2: The Platform as Polis (Suzor)**

In "Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives," Nicolas P. Suzor argues that the major internet platforms have become our de facto rulers, but that they govern in a "lawless" manner.5 His critique is not that these platforms necessarily violate state laws, but that their exercise of power does not adhere to the fundamental principles of the

**Rule of Law**, which are the basis of legitimate governance in democratic societies.6

#### **The Problem of "Lawlessness"**

Suzor diagnoses the central problem as a lack of legitimacy in private governance. Decisions about what can be said, who can participate, and how rules are enforced are often:

* **Arbitrary and Inconsistent:** The rules (terms of service) are vague and applied unevenly, depending on public pressure or commercial interests.17  
* **Non-Transparent:** Users rarely understand why a decision was made, which specific rule they violated, or how the decision-making process worked.6  
* **Without Due Process:** There is no clear path for a fair appeal. Banned users or those whose content is removed have few or no avenues to present their case before an impartial body.6

This "lawless" governance creates an environment of uncertainty and distrust, undermining the ability of platforms to function as healthy and democratic social spaces.5

#### **Principles of Digital Constitutionalism**

As a solution, Suzor proposes **digital constitutionalism**. This concept advocates for applying constitutional values to the private governance exercised by platforms.6 Instead of relying solely on state regulation (top-down) or market forces (which have proven insufficient), Suzor argues that platforms themselves should develop internal governance structures that incorporate the principles of the Rule of Law. The pillars of this model include:

* **Legitimacy:** Rules must be clear, predictable, and consistently applied.6  
* **Procedural Fairness:** Users must have the right to notification, to be heard, and to a meaningful appeal before an independent or impartial body.6  
* **Accountability:** Platforms must be accountable for their governance decisions, both to their users and to society at large.17  
* **Respect for Human Rights:** Platform governance must be compatible with international human rights standards, especially freedom of expression.6

Suzor suggests that this constitutionalization should primarily emerge "from the inside out," with platforms creating their own "constitutions" and oversight bodies, driven by pressure from civil society, users, and smart state regulation that encourages these structures rather than dictating specific content rules.5

Suzor's analysis offers a vital correction to a potential gap in the Eudaimonia 2.0 governance model. The proposed Restorative Justice (RJ) model is an excellent tool for managing *horizontal* conflicts, i.e., between users, where the goal is to repair relationships and strengthen the community.2 However, it is inadequate for managing

*vertical* conflicts, which occur between a user and an authority (be it the platform or the governance of a "Living World"). When a user is banned or their content is removed, it is not just a "broken relationship," but an act of private governmental power. RJ does not offer the necessary safeguards against the arbitrary exercise of that power. Suzor's digital constitutionalism fills this gap. It requires that, in addition to RJ, Eudaimonia implement a "two-tiered justice" system. For vertical disputes, a quasi-judicial system, such as an appeals board or an independent arbitration process, would be necessary to assess whether moderation decisions were fair, proportional, and consistent with the community's "laws" as established in its constitution.

### **Section 3: The Platform as an Ordering System (Katzenbach & Ulbricht)**

In the article "Algorithmic governance," Christian Katzenbach and Lena Ulbricht provide a conceptual framework for understanding the role of algorithms in digital society, not as passive tools, but as active agents of governance.7 They argue that algorithms are becoming central mechanisms of social ordering, influencing behavior, distributing resources, and defining what is visible and possible in the digital environment.

#### **Definition of Algorithmic Governance**

The authors define algorithmic governance as "a form of social ordering that relies on coordination between actors, is based on rules and incorporates particularly complex computer-based epistemic procedures."8 This definition is crucial because it shifts the focus from the mere technical functionality of the algorithm to its social and political impact. A recommendation algorithm is not just "suggesting content"; it is governing attention. A moderation algorithm is not just "filtering spam"; it is governing discourse.

#### **Multiplicity and Contingency**

A central point of their argument is that algorithmic governance is not a monolithic phenomenon. On the contrary, it is **multiple, contingent, and contested**.7 This means that the way an algorithm governs depends on its specific context of implementation, the economic and political interests that shape it, the data it is fed, and the ways users resist, circumvent, or appropriate its functioning. There is no single "algorithmic governance," but rather a variety of governance practices that use algorithms.

#### **Key Controversies**

Katzenbach and Ulbricht identify a set of recurring controversies that emerge in different domains of algorithmic governance, including datafication and surveillance, bias and discrimination, the question of human agency versus automation, and the opacity versus transparency of systems.7 These controversies reveal the fundamental tensions that arise when decision-making processes with significant social consequences are delegated to computational systems.

The combination of the Algorithmic Governance and Fiduciary Duty lenses creates a new and powerful standard of demand for Eudaimonia: **Fiduciary Algorithmic Governance**. The algorithms proposed for Eudaimonia, such as the Polis deliberation system or the "AI Companion," are clear examples of powerful governance agents that actively shape the platform's social reality.2 Katzenbach & Ulbricht's analysis forces us to recognize them as such.8 At the same time, Balkin's theory establishes that the platform has a fiduciary duty to its users.4

These two points cannot be considered in isolation. The governance power exercised by Eudaimonia's algorithms must be intrinsically subject to the fiduciary duty. This has profound implications. It means, for example, that the "AI Companion" cannot legitimately "nudge" a user towards a behavior that benefits the "health of the platform" or the community's goals at the expense of that individual user's well-being and expressed interests. The algorithm's primary loyalty must be to its user, not to the system. This cannot be a mere ethical guideline; it must be a coded and auditable constraint in its design, transforming a legal principle into a technical requirement.

### **Section 4: The Platform as a Public Service (Plantin et al.)**

In the article "Infrastructure studies meet platform studies in the age of Google and Facebook," Jean-Christophe Plantin and his co-authors analyze the convergence of two fields of study to explain the nature of large contemporary digital platforms.9 They argue that these entities have evolved from mere "platforms" to become essential "infrastructures" of modern life.

#### **From Platform to Infrastructure**

The authors describe the process of **"infrastructuralization,"** through which digital services like Google search or Facebook's social network become so fundamental, ubiquitous, and integrated into daily life that they begin to function analogously to traditional infrastructures like power grids or transportation systems.9 An infrastructure is characterized by its reliability, widespread accessibility, and, crucially, its "invisibility"—we only notice its existence when it fails.

#### **The Public-Private Tension**

Historically, critical infrastructures were considered public goods, managed or heavily regulated by the state to ensure universal access and serve the public interest. The analysis by Plantin et al. highlights the fundamental tension that emerges when these new digital infrastructures are owned and operated by private, for-profit companies.10 Decisions about the design, access, and costs of these infrastructures are made based on market logic and shareholder interests, not necessarily the common good.

#### **Convergence of Logics**

The article also identifies a dual movement: while platforms become infrastructures ("infrastructuralization of platforms"), traditional infrastructures are being "platformized" ("platformization of infrastructure")—that is, they are being fragmented, privatized, and managed through interfaces and APIs that resemble digital platforms.10 This convergence makes the analysis of the power and governance of these hybrid systems even more crucial.

Adopting the lens of infrastructuralization for Eudaimonia fundamentally elevates the project's importance and responsibility. The vision of Eudaimonia 2.0 already aspired to be more than an application: a "decentralized collaborative operating system."2 The work of Plantin et al. provides the precise term for this ambition: a

**social infrastructure**. Viewing Eudaimonia as an infrastructure, and not just a social network, has direct consequences for its design and goals. Stability, resilience (the core of antifragility), interoperability, and universal accessibility cease to be desirable features and become public service obligations. This justifies an even greater investment in the robustness of the core protocol (reinforcing the logic of the "barbell strategy") and in the universality of the "Rights as an Operating System" proposed in Eudaimonia 2.0, as these are the foundations upon which a public digital infrastructure must be built. The project's failure would not be that of a startup, but that of a common good.

### **Section 5: The Platform in Practice (Zignani, Gaito et al.)**

The report "Decentralised Social Media," attributed to authors such as Matteo Zignani and Sabrina Gaito, offers a pragmatic and essential counterpoint to the more theoretical discussions.11 By analyzing the real-world functioning of existing decentralized social networks, primarily those that make up the Fediverse like Mastodon, the work exposes the operational challenges and power dynamics that emerge in these ecosystems.11

#### **Governance Models in the Fediverse**

The analysis reveals that governance in the Fediverse is largely fragmented. Power resides primarily at the level of the **individual instance**. The administrator of a Mastodon instance has almost absolute control over that community: they define the moderation rules, manage user data, and can unilaterally decide to block (defederate) communication with other instances.11 Although there are influential entities like Mastodon gGmbH, which develops the main software, there is no central authority that imposes rules on the entire ecosystem.11

#### **Pragmatic Challenges of Decentralization**

The study details a series of practical challenges that plague these networks:

* **Moderation and Harmful Content:** The absence of a centralized moderation policy makes the Fediverse vulnerable to the proliferation of misinformation, hate speech, and harassment. The responsibility falls on instance administrators, often volunteers without resources, who can themselves be targets of attacks.11  
* **Technical Complexity and Sustainability:** Operating an instance requires technical knowledge and financial resources, creating a barrier to entry and raising questions about the long-term sustainability of smaller instances.11  
* **Data Recovery and Portability:** User sovereignty over their data is an ideal, but in practice, if an instance shuts down, users can lose their accounts, data, and social connections. Identity migration between instances is still a significant technical challenge.11

#### **Emergent Centralization**

Perhaps the most crucial insight from the work is the observation that **architectural decentralization does not eliminate the centralization of power**. On the contrary, new forms of centralization emerge: very popular instances become network hubs, and their administrators acquire disproportionate power. The operator's control over their instance is, in essence, a form of small-scale centralized governance.12

This practical analysis of the Fediverse serves as a crucial warning for the design of Eudaimonia. The "Living Worlds" model proposed in Eudaimonia 2.0, where thematic communities are created and managed by their members, is functionally analogous to a Mastodon instance.2 Without robust safeguards, there is a real risk that each "Living World" will turn into a digital fiefdom, where the creator or initial moderators hold arbitrary and absolute power over the community members, precisely replicating the "lawless" governance problems that Suzor criticizes in centralized platforms.6

This reveals a direct and powerful synergy between academic theory and operational challenges. Suzor's digital constitutionalism is not an abstract ideal; it is the practical antidote to the "tyrant of the instance" problem identified by Zignani et al..11 Applying Suzor's principles—clear rules, due process, appeal mechanisms, and limits on power—at the level of each "Living World" becomes a design necessity to prevent the fragmentation of Eudaimonia into a collection of micro-dictatorships and to ensure that the promise of fair and pluralistic governance is realized in practice.

## **Part II: A Comprehensive Reassessment of the Eudaimonia 2.0 Project**

With the conceptual arsenal from Part I established, this section will systematically apply the five lenses—fiduciary, constitutional, algorithmic, infrastructural, and pragmatic—to the specific components of the Eudaimonia 2.0 project, as detailed in the document "From Antifragile to Plural."2 The goal is to identify points of strengthening, potential gaps, and new directions for the platform's development.

### **Section 6: Reassessing the Philosophical and Ethical Mandate**

The ethical mandate of Eudaimonia 2.0 is ambitious: to evolve from a platform that simply "does no harm" to one that actively "regenerates diversity" and promotes human flourishing.2 However, the new theoretical lenses demand an expansion and deepening of this mandate.

#### **Beyond Regenerating Diversity**

The goal of "regenerating diversity" is an excellent example of the Plurality philosophy, focused on social generativity.2 However, the fiduciary (Balkin) and constitutional (Suzor) duties impose an even more fundamental and prior ethical mandate: the

**duty to protect**. Before it can generate value from difference, the platform must ensure a safe environment where that difference can exist without fear of exploitation or oppression. The mandate of Eudaimonia 3.0 must, therefore, be twofold: (1) to actively protect users and their communities against harm and the arbitrary exercise of power, both from the platform and from other users, through legitimate governance; and (2) with this foundation of security established, to foster productive interaction to regenerate diversity. Protection becomes the condition of possibility for plurality.

#### **Restorative Justice vs. Procedural Justice**

The Restorative Justice (RJ) model proposed in Eudaimonia 2.0 is innovative and appropriate for its specific domain: *horizontal* conflicts between users.2 Its focus on repairing relationships and strengthening community ties is perfectly aligned with the platform's ethos. However, its application to

*vertical* conflicts—disputes between a user and the governing authority of a "Living World" or the platform as a whole—is problematic. As argued by Suzor, such conflicts are not merely about broken relationships; they are about the exercise of power and the rights of the individual before that power.6

The solution is a **two-tiered justice system**:

1. **Restorative Justice (Horizontal Layer):** Maintained for interpersonal disputes, focused on mediation and reconciliation.  
2. **Procedural Justice (Vertical Layer):** A new system, inspired by Suzor's digital constitutionalism, to manage complaints against moderation or governance decisions. This system must guarantee fundamental due process rights, including: the right to be notified of the specific accusation, the right to present a defense, and the right to an appeal before a body that is (or at least appears to be) impartial and independent of the entity that made the original decision.6

#### **Moderation in the Fediverse: A Practical Warning**

The practical challenges of moderation in decentralized networks, as detailed by Zignani et al., underscore the urgency of this two-tiered approach.11 The proliferation of misinformation, harassment, and other harmful content in the Fediverse is not due to a failure of intention, but a failure of structure. The exclusive reliance on overwhelmed instance administrators without formal processes creates an ineffective moderation system prone to burnout and abuse.11 Eudaimonia must learn from this lesson. The implementation of robust moderation tools (including automated ones, like Reddit's AutoModerator 22) and, more importantly, of clear and fair governance processes (the Procedural Justice layer) is not a luxury, but a necessity for the long-term viability of any digital ecosystem at scale.

### **Section 7: Reassessing the Architecture: From Decentralized Network to Legitimate Public Infrastructure**

Eudaimonia 2.0 was conceived as a "decentralized collaborative operating system."2 The lens of Plantin et al. allows us to refine this vision, arguing that Eudaimonia should be

*intentionally* designed as a **critical social infrastructure**.10 This shift in framing from "network" or "OS" to "infrastructure" has significant implications for its architecture.

#### **Intentional Infrastructuralization**

If Eudaimonia is an infrastructure, then its core protocols must possess the qualities of a public infrastructure: they must be open, stable, resilient, interoperable, and universally accessible. This reinforces the decision to build on P2P protocols like Livepeer and Theta 23, but also requires that the social protocols developed by Eudaimonia itself be equally open and standardized. The goal is not to create a decentralized "walled garden," but to contribute a fundamental layer to the digital commons.

#### **Reinforcing "Rights as an OS"**

This infrastructural perspective elevates the importance of the "Rights as an Operating System" proposed in Eudaimonia 2.0.2 They cease to be just innovative features and become the constitutional pillars of the infrastructure.

* **Identity with Community Recovery:** This system, where a user's identity is recoverable through a quorum of their trusted communities, is not just a security enhancement.2 It is an  
  **infrastructural guarantee** against catastrophic exclusion from the digital ecosystem. It directly solves one of the most serious practical problems of decentralized networks identified by Zignani et al.: the irrecoverable loss of identity and data.11  
* **"Plural Publics" with Contextual Integrity:** The ability to create "Living Worlds" as spaces with distinct cryptographic and informational boundaries 2 is the technical implementation of the constitutional right to free association, a pillar of Suzor's theory.6 It is also a necessary condition for Balkin's fiduciary trust, as it allows users to control the context in which their information is shared, a central principle of Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity."25  
* **Collective Property as a "Data Coalition":** The proposal to treat each "Living World" as a form of collective property, governed by its community 2, aligns perfectly with the vision of Balkin and others that relational data and the value co-created in a community should not be treated as individual property, but as a common good to be managed collectively by a "Data Coalition" or a data fiduciary.3 This transforms the "ownership economy" from a model focused on the individual creator to one focused on community sovereignty.

### **Section 8: Reassessing Governance: From DAOs and Polis to Digital Constitutionalism**

The governance structure of Eudaimonia 2.0, with its hybrid DAO for platform decisions and the integration of tools like Polis for community deliberation, is sophisticated.2 Polis is excellent for consensus discovery in large groups (the "legislature" in its discovery mode) 27, and a DAO is a mechanism for ratifying decisions (the "legislature" in its voting mode). However, this structure, by itself, does not constitute a complete and legitimate governance system. It lacks clearly defined and limited "executive" and "judicial" powers.

#### **Incorporating the Rule of Law**

Based on Suzor's analysis, Eudaimonia 3.0 needs an explicit and formal **"Constitution."**6 This would not be a mere "terms of service" document, but the fundamental law of the platform, developed participatorily and difficult to change. This constitution should outline:

1. **A Bill of Rights:** Enumerate the inalienable rights of users, such as freedom of expression (within defined limits), the right to association, the right to digital property (individual and collective), the right to privacy, and, crucially, the right to due process in disputes with authority.  
2. **Separation of Powers:** Clearly define the spheres of competence and the limits of different governance bodies. For example, the general DAO could be responsible for allocating the platform's treasury, but could not interfere in the internal governance of a "Living World" that does not violate the constitution. The core protocol development team could have autonomy for technical updates, but not for changing economic rules without the DAO's consent.  
3. **Checks and Balances:** Implement mechanisms that prevent the concentration of power. This could include a community veto power (through a supermajority vote) over certain decisions of the development team, or requiring high quorums for constitutional amendments.

#### **The Challenge of Fiduciary Legitimacy in DAO Governance**

Applying Balkin's fiduciary lens to DAO governance raises complex questions.4 How can a majority-token governance (even if mitigated by reputation) fulfill a fiduciary duty to

*all* users, especially minorities or those with less voting power? What prevents a majority from voting to expropriate the assets of a minority within a "Living World" or from changing the rules in a way that disproportionately benefits large token holders?

The answer lies in constitutionalism. The fiduciary duty of the platform as a whole is fulfilled by establishing and enforcing a constitution that protects the rights of minorities against the **"tyranny of the majority."** The constitution acts as the safeguard that ensures democratic governance (via DAO) operates within fair and loyal limits to all participants, not just those who hold voting power.

### **Section 9: Reassessing the AI Companion: From Facilitator to Fiduciary Algorithmic Governor**

The "AI Companion" is one of the most visionary proposals of Eudaimonia 2.0, conceived as a therapeutic coach and a facilitator of collective intelligence.2 However, the lens of algorithmic governance from Katzenbach & Ulbricht requires us to recognize it for what it truly is: a powerful

**algorithmic governance agent** that actively structures the user experience, their interactions, and the very social reality of the platform.8

#### **The Ordering Power of the Companion**

Its proposed functions—assisting in the navigation of faceted identities, summarizing complex Polis deliberations, and suggesting new collaborations—are all forms of governance.2 It does not just reflect the platform's reality; it actively constructs it for the user. This realization makes its governance a matter of primary importance.

#### **Imposing Fiduciary Duties on AI**

The solution to governing this power is to apply Balkin's fiduciary duty directly to it, leading to the creation of a new model: the **Fiduciary AI**. The programming and operation of the AI Companion must be legally and technically obligated to act in the best interest *of its specific user*. This means that, in case of conflict, the Companion's loyalty is to the individual it serves, and not to the interests of the community, the platform, or any other actor.13 For example, if the Companion detects that participation in a certain community is causing psychological stress to the user, its fiduciary duty would be to suggest disengagement or seeking alternatives, even if that community is highly "productive" for the platform.

#### **Radical Transparency and Auditability**

This Fiduciary AI must be radically transparent and auditable. The user must have the ability to "inspect" the underlying logic of their Companion's recommendations ("Why are you suggesting this to me?") and to adjust its operating parameters. This demand for transparency and user control aligns directly with Suzor's principle of accountability in digital constitutionalism 6 and transforms the AI Companion from a potential "black box" of manipulation into a genuine instrument of personal empowerment.

The following table summarizes how the new theoretical lenses apply to specific features of Eudaimonia, providing a conceptual map for the project's evolution.

**Table 3: Mapping New Concepts to Eudaimonia's Features**

| Theoretical Concept (Source) | Affected Eudaimonia Feature | Key Implication/Recommendation |
| :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Fiduciary Duty** (Balkin 4) | AI Companion, Platform Governance | The AI Companion must be a "Fiduciary AI," legally and technically obligated to act in its user's best interest. The platform has a duty of loyalty not to manipulate users. |
| **Digital Constitutionalism** (Suzor 6) | "Living Worlds" Governance, Conflict Resolution | Implement a "Two-Tiered Justice" system, with due process and right of appeal for vertical disputes (user vs. authority). Each "Living World" must have a constitution. |
| **Algorithmic Governance** (Katzenbach/Ulbricht 8) | Polis, AI Companion, Discovery Algorithms | Recognize algorithms as active governance agents, not neutral tools. Their logic must be transparent, auditable, and subject to fiduciary and constitutional duties. |
| **Infrastructuralization** (Plantin et al. 10) | Protocol Architecture, "Rights as an OS" | Intentionally design Eudaimonia as a public digital infrastructure, prioritizing the openness, stability, and universality of its fundamental protocols. |
| **Practical Challenges of Decentralization** (Zignani et al. 11) | "Living Worlds" Governance, Digital Identity | Digital Constitutionalism at the level of each "Living World" is the practical antidote to the "tyrant of the instance" problem. Identity with Community Recovery solves the problem of access loss. |

## **Part III: Synthesis and Recommendations for Eudaimonia 3.0**

This final part synthesizes the analyses from the previous sections to articulate a cohesive vision for Eudaimonia 3.0 and propose an implementation roadmap that translates this vision into concrete actions.

### **Section 10: The Vision for Eudaimonia 3.0: A Public, Fiduciary, and Constitutional Infrastructure**

The integration of the five theoretical lenses culminates in a vision for Eudaimonia 3.0 that is significantly more robust and defensible. This new vision does not abandon the principles of Antifragility and Plurality but frames them within a structure of legitimacy. The ultimate goal transcends the creation of a better social network; it is the construction of a **legitimate and self-governed digital polis**.

Eudaimonia 3.0 is defined by three interconnected pillars:

1. **It is a Public Infrastructure:** It recognizes its role as an essential service for collaboration and social well-being, committing to openness, stability, and universal accessibility.10  
2. **It is a Fiduciary Entity:** It accepts its responsibility to act with care, loyalty, and confidentiality towards its users, protecting them from exploitation and manipulation.4  
3. **It is a Constitutional Order:** It governs itself and its constituent communities through principles of the Rule of Law, ensuring procedural justice, accountability, and respect for fundamental rights.6

The practical manifestation and guarantee of this vision is the creation and adoption of an **Eudaimonia Constitutional Charter**. This living document, developed participatorily, would be the supreme law of the ecosystem. A sketch of its structure could include:

* **Preamble:** Articulation of the core philosophy of Plurality, human flourishing (Eudaimonia), and the commitment to legitimate governance.  
* **Article I: Rights of Citizens (Users):** Enshrinement of fundamental rights within the ecosystem, including freedom of expression and association, digital property (individual and collective), privacy (contextual integrity), and the right to due process (notification, hearing, appeal).  
* **Article II: Governance Structure (Separation of Powers):** Clear definition of the powers and limits of the general DAO (responsible for the treasury and platform-level policies), the "Living Worlds" DAOs (responsible for local governance), and the core protocol development entity.  
* **Article III: The Judiciary (The Oversight Council):** Establishment of an independent appeal body or a decentralized arbitration system to resolve constitutional disputes and complaints against governance decisions. This body would have the authority to overturn decisions that violate the Charter.  
* **Article IV: The Fiduciary Duty:** Explicit codification of the duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality of the platform and its algorithmic systems (such as the Fiduciary AI) towards users.  
* **Article V: Amendment Process:** Establishment of a rigorous process with supermajority requirements to amend the Constitution itself, ensuring its stability and protecting it from capricious changes.

The following table illustrates the conceptual evolution of the project, highlighting the crucial additions of Eudaimonia 3.0.

**Table 4: The Evolution of Eudaimonia**

| Feature | Eudaimonia 1.0 (Antifragile) | Eudaimonia 2.0 (Plural) | Eudaimonia 3.0 (Constitutional/Fiduciary) |
| :---- | :---- | :---- | :---- |
| **Core Philosophy** | Antifragility (Systemic Resilience) 2 | Plurality (Social Generativity) 2 | Legitimacy (Fair and Responsible Governance) |
| **Main Goal** | System survival and strengthening | Collaboration and innovation through difference | Protection of rights and legitimate exercise of power |
| **Governance Model** | DAO for treasury resilience | Hybrid DAO \+ Augmented Deliberation (Polis) | Constitutional Order with separation of powers (Legislative, Executive, Judicial) |
| **Platform-User Relationship** | Provider of robust infrastructure | Partner in a collaborative ecosystem | Fiduciary with duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality |
| **Conflict Resolution** | Restorative Justice (implicit) | Restorative Justice (explicit) | Two-Tiered Justice: Restorative (horizontal) and Procedural (vertical) |
| **Role of AI** | Tool for individual therapy | Facilitator of collective intelligence | Fiduciary Algorithmic Governor, subject to the Constitution |

### **Section 11: A Revised Implementation Roadmap**

The transition to Eudaimonia 3.0 requires a roadmap that goes beyond feature development and focuses on building governance institutions.

#### **Technical Recommendations**

1. **Prioritize the Judicial Layer:** The development of protocols for the "Judiciary" is now a top priority. This includes creating smart contracts for appeal systems, voting in oversight councils, and on-chain arbitration mechanisms. Technology must serve justice, not the other way around.  
2. **Develop Oracles of Legitimacy:** Investigate and prototype "oracles" that can monitor and verify the compliance of algorithms with fiduciary duties. For example, an oracle could audit the AI Companion's code to ensure its optimization function is aligned with the user's interests, not with platform engagement metrics.  
3. **Design Interfaces for Digital Citizenship:** User interfaces (UI) must be designed not just for content consumption, but for the exercise of citizenship. This means creating clear and accessible interfaces for participating in governance: reading proposals, voting, consulting the constitution, submitting a formal complaint, and tracking its process.

#### **Governance Recommendations**

1. **Initiate a Participatory Constituent Process:** The first non-technical step should be to launch an open deliberative process, using tools like Polis 27, to draft the first version of the Eudaimonia Constitutional Charter. This act of co-creating the fundamental law will be the founding test of the platform's legitimacy.  
2. **Establish Strategic Partnerships:** Form alliances with legal, digital rights, and academic organizations (such as those that produce the type of research analyzed in this report) to assist in the design and operation of the independent judicial system. External legitimacy is as important as internal legitimacy.  
3. **Adopt Progressive Decentralization of Constitutional Power:** Create a clear roadmap for the gradual transfer of power over the platform's evolution to the community, always within the limits and processes defined by the constitution. This may involve transitioning control over the core protocol's code repository to a DAO once the maturity and stability of the governance system are proven.

## **Conclusion: Beyond a Better Social Network, a Legitimate Digital Polis**

This report has traced an intellectual journey for the Eudaimonia project, from its foundations in systemic resilience to a future vision based on legitimate governance. The progression can be summarized as follows:

* **Eudaimonia 1.0 (Antifragile):** Focused on the survival and strengthening of the system in the face of volatility, establishing a robust technical base.2  
* **Eudaimonia 2.0 (Plural):** Elevated the ambition to social generativity, seeing diversity as the fuel for collaboration and democratic innovation.2  
* **Eudaimonia 3.0 (Constitutional/Fiduciary):** Recognizes that a plural and collaborative society can only be sustained in the long term if the power that governs it is legitimate, fair, and responsible.

The integration of the lenses of fiduciary theory, digital constitutionalism, algorithmic governance, infrastructuralization, and the practical lessons of decentralization is not a mere addition of features. It is a fundamental reconfiguration of the project's purpose. It demonstrates that the viability and success of a digital utopia like Eudaimonia depend not only on its brilliant social and technical engineering but, even more critically, on its **political and legal engineering**.

Legitimacy is not an optional extra to be added later. It is the foundation upon which trust, genuine participation, and human flourishing can be built and, more importantly, sustained in the face of inevitable challenges. By embracing this deeper vision, Eudaimonia can transcend the goal of being a "better social network" to become a functional and hopeful prototype of a digital polis for the 21st century—an infrastructure for the common good that is antifragile in its structure, plural in its spirit, and constitutional in its soul.

## **References**

Allen, Danielle S. 2013\. “A Connected Society.” *Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture* 53 (Spring): 103–13. 30

Balkin, Jack M. 2016\. “Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment.” *UC Davis Law Review* 49 (4): 1183–1234. 3

Buterin, Vitalik, Zoë Hitzig, and E. Glen Weyl. 2019\. “A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods.” *Management Science* 65 (11): 5171–87. 35

Dewey, John. 1927\. *The Public and Its Problems*. New York: Holt. 37

Katzenbach, Christian, and Lena Ulbricht. 2019\. “Algorithmic governance.” *Internet Policy Review* 8 (4): 1–18. 7

Licklider, J. C. R. 1960\. “Man–Computer Symbiosis.” *IRE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics* HFE-1 (March): 4–11. 39

Livitckaia, Kristina, Iordanis Papoutsoglou, Konstantinos Votis, and Ioannis Revolidis. 2024\. “Decentralised Social Media.” *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 11

Nissenbaum, Helen. 2009\. *Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life*. Stanford: Stanford Law Books. 25

Petkanics, Doug, and Eric Tang. 2017\. “Livepeer Whitepaper: Protocol and Economic Incentives For a Decentralized Live Video Streaming Network.” Livepeer. 24

Plantin, Jean-Christophe, Carl Lagoze, Paul N. Edwards, and Christian Sandvig. 2018\. “Infrastructure studies meet platform studies in the age of Google and Facebook.” *New Media & Society* 20 (1): 293–310. 9

Simmel, Georg. 1955\. *Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations*. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 43

Suzor, Nicolas P. 2019\. *Lawless: The Secret Rules That Govern Our Digital Lives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. 2012\. *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder*. New York: Random House. 1

Theta Labs. 2022\. “Theta Mainnet 4.0 Whitepaper.” 45

Weyl, E. Glen, Audrey Tang, and the Plurality Community. 2024\. *Plurality: The Future of Collaborative Technology and Democracy*. RadicalxChange. 46

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